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Abstract 
Based on reference to Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order tournaments mechanism model, this essay introduces the 
two variables, namely capacity variance and task difficulty, to establish a long-term mechanism model for the 
government to encourage enterprises for low-carbon development. It is included through model analysis that, the 
optimal effort level during enterprises’ low-carbon development is directly proportional to bonus difference (L-l) set 
by the government, and inversely proportional to task difficulty, capacity variance and “performance” appraisal error. 
When enterprises’ capacities are identical, their optimal effort level will be the highest and equal. Besides, the 
government should take task difficulty and capacity into comprehensive consideration to set reasonable bonus 
difference. If task difficulty is relatively large, the government should enlarge bonus difference; if task difficulty is 
small, the government should correspondingly shorten bonus difference. 
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1. Introduction 
The climate change is seriously threatening ecological balance throughout the world, and has 
brought serious loss to economic development of human society. All countries in the world start to carry 
out moral reflection on related economic development models, and gradually realize that low-
carbonization is the optimal economic model for coping with global climate change. Through analysis 
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based on information economics, there is always entrust-agency relation in the governmental 
encouragement for enterprises’ low-carbon development, among which, the government is the entrustor 
and the enterprise is the agent. However,  due to information asymmetry between the government and 
enterprises, the government has difficulty in correctly defining effort level and performance of enterprises 
in low-carbon development; on the other hand, the enterprises possibly conduct opportunism behaviors 
during low-carbon development for the sake of their own benefits maximization so that governmental and 
public benefits may be infringed on. The domestic research literatures on low-carbon economy is 
basically concentrated on qualitative description such as connotations and development paths etc. [1]-[4], 
but there are insufficient literatures of enterprises’ low-carbon development by use of entrust-agency 
theory. Mr. Liu Weiguo and others (2010) applied multi-task entrust-agency model to the research on 
optimal incentive mechanism of enterprises’ low-carbon development [5]. Referring to research methods 
of Malcomson model, Mr. Liu Weiguo and others (2011) structured the incentive mechanism frame of 
enterprises’ low-carbon economy development including contracts in Phase 1 and Phase 2[6]; however, 
the above literatures have not taken the influence of participants’ psychological factors on their behaviors 
into consideration. The research results in psychology show that participants’ capacity variance and the 
difficulty of faced tasks always affect human’s decision-making behaviors[7].In consideration of the 
important significance of enterprises’ low-carbon development for the realization of energy-saving and 
emission-reducing targets and the construction of resource-conserving and environment-friendly society 
according to China’s “Twelfth Five-Year Plan”, based on reference to standard rank-order tournaments 
mechanism model [8] put forward by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and the above reference literatures, this 
essay introduces two variables, namely enterprises’ capacity variance and task difficulty, to structure a 
long-term mechanism model for the government to encourage enterprises for low-carbon development, 
and subsequently provide theoretical basis for China’s low-carbon development. 
2. Model Structuring 
Assumed conditions will be provided for the government to encourage enterprises on low-carbon 
economy development as following. 
Assumption 1: Assume that the government is the entrustor and the enterprise is the agent, the model 
comprises one entrustor (the government) and two agents (Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2). All the 
participants are of risk neutral and the reserved utility of enterprises is 0. 
Assumption 2: Assume that the “performance” of enterprises’ low-carbon development is measured 
by carbon emission reduction capacity, and the performance function for enterprises’ low-carbon 
development is illustrated as following: 
πi=kixi +εi, (i=1,2)                                                                    (1) 
Among which: xi represents effort level of Enterprise i in carbon emission reduction, kirepresents 
capacity level of Enterprise i in carbon emission reduction, the more of ki, the stronger of the enterprise’s 
carbon emission reduction capacity, namely the more output with the same efforts; on the contrary, the 
less of ki, the weaker of the enterprise’s carbon emission reduction capacity, namely the less output with 
the same efforts; and ki∈(σπ-1/2, k ), k represents ultimate limit of the enterprise’s carbon emission 
reduction capacity under certain circumstances. εi represents independent random variable which has 
influence on the “performance” of Enterprise i, complying with the normal distribution of  N(0, σ2). Thus, 
it can be concluded that Eπi=kixi ,Varπi=σ2. 
Assumption 3: Assume that during enterprises’ low-carbon development, the efforts cost for carbon 
emission is represented by c(xi). Obviously, the more efforts Enterprise i makes in carbon emission, the 
more cost, namely c’(xi)>0, and increasing gradually, that is c’’(xi)>0, Assumed efforts cost is illustrated 
in specific function as following: 
c (xi)=a x2i /2ki                                                                        (2) 
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       Among which: a represents task difficulty coefficient of carbon emission, and a>0. The more of a, 
the more difficult for the enterprise’s carbon emission; on the contrary, the less of a, the less difficult for 
the enterprise’s carbon emission. Obviously, the enterprise with strong carbon emission capacity has 
relatively low cost; herein, the more of ki, the stronger of the enterprise’s carbon emission capacity, 
namely the cost is relatively low with the same efforts; on the contrary, the less of ki, the weaker of the 
enterprise’s carbon emission capacity, namely the cost will be higher with the same efforts. 
Assumption 4: Assume that during enterprises’ low-carbon development, the incentive contract 
provided by the government to enterprises for their low-carbon development is: 
s(πi )=Lpi+l(1-pi)                                                                      (3) 
Among which: the government provides high “bonus” L to enterprises with large carbon emission 
reduction and low “bonus” l to enterprises with small carbon emission reduction, and L >l, Δ=L-l; ip  
represents the probability that the carbon emission reduction capacity of Enterprise i is more than that of 
Enterprise j during low-carbon development. 
Assumption 5: Assume that enterprises are of risk neutral, the expected revenue of Enterprise i  in 
carbon emission reduction: 
E(sπi)= Lpi+l(1-pi)  - a x2i /2ki                                                      (4) 
So far, this essay has structured the two-phase rank-order tournaments model for low-carbon 
development with the government and two enterprises (E1 and E2); at phase 1, the government chooses 
bonus L and l for the sake of maximization of its revenue; at phase 2, with given bonus L and l by the 
government, the two enterprises (E1 and E2) respectively choose feasible effort level of carbon emission 
reduction x1 and x2, and maximize their own revenues. 
3. Model Solution and Analysis 
This essay applies backward induction method to solve this game problem. Firstly, given the L and l 
are fixed, the two enterprises (E1 and E2) choose effort level of carbon emission reduction; and then the 
government set the optimal bonus with balanced efforts by enterprises. 
3.1 Analysis on Effort level of Enterprises’ Carbon Emission Reduction 
The probability for Enterprise E1 to win in low-carbon economy development is: p1=prob(π1>π2), 
substitute πi=kixi +εi into the formula, it can be obtained that: 
p1=prob(k1x1+ε1 > k2x2+ε2) = prob(k1x1- k2x2 >ε2-ε1)                      (5) 
 Similiarly: p2= prob(k2x3- k1x1 >ε1-ε2). 
Thus, the expected revenues for Enterprise 1 and Enterprise are respectively: 
E(sπ1)= Lp1+l(1-p1)  - a x21 /2k1  ; E(sπ2)= Lp2+l(1-p2)  - a x22 /2k2                    (6) 
Results by calculation: 
E(sπ1)= l+p1(L-l) - a x12 /2k1  ; E(sπ2)= l+p2(L-l)  - a x22 /2k2                        (7) 
From the first order condition of ∂Eπ1/∂x1=0 and∂Eπ2/∂x3=0, each enterprise’s pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium can be obtained: 
∂p1/∂x1(L-l)= a x1 /k1 ; ∂p2/∂x2(L-l)= a x2 /k2                                    (8) 
According to the above assumption, random variable εi is independent and identically distributed 
normal distribution, with compliant mean value being 0 and variance being σ2 , thus the winning 
probability for Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2 in carbon emission reduction competition is illustrated as 
following: 
∂p1/∂x1= (k1/2σπ-1/2)e-(k1x1-k2x2)2/4σ2; ∂p2/∂x2= (k2/2σπ-1/2)e-(k2x2-k1x1)2/4σ2                   (9) 
Substitute Formula (9) into Formula (8), work out  x*1 and x*2  to obtain: 
x*1 =( (L-l)k12/2aσπ-1/2)e-(k1x1-k2x2)2/4σ2; x*2= ( (L-l)k22/2aσπ-1/2)e-(k2x2-k1x1)2/4σ2                 (10) 
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Formula (11) reveals that, there are certain relations for enterprises’ balanced effort level with bonus 
difference L-l, “performance” observation error σ, task difficultya and enterprises’ capacity, and thus it 
can included as following: 
(1) The effort level of enterprises’ low-carbon development is directly proportional to bonus 
difference L-l set by the government, namely with the enlarging of bonus difference L-l, the effort level of 
enterprises’ low-carbon development become higher; herein, incentive strength depends on bonus 
difference set by the government; the government can push forward the competition among enterprises 
and subsequently promote low-carbon development by way of enlarging bonus difference. 
(2) The effort level of enterprises’ low-carbon development is reversely proportional to 
“performance” observation error σ by the government, namely with the increasing of “performance” 
observation error σ, the optimal effort level of enterprise’ low-carbon development becomes lower. 
(3) The effort level of enterprises’ low-carbon development is reversely proportional to task 
difficulty a, namely when enterprises face relatively easy carbon emission tasks, even if bonus difference 
is small or “performance” observation error is large, enterprises shall also take much efforts in low-
carbon development; on the contrary, when enterprises face relatively large task difficulty in carbon 
emission reduction, the government needs to increase bonus difference or improve “performance” 
observation accuracy to push forward enterprises to improve their optimal effort level. 
(4) The effort level of enterprises’ low-carbon development is reversely proportional to capacity 
variance, namely the larger of enterprises’ capacity varianceΔk, the lower of optimal effort level. 
The cause for this phenomenon is that the rank-order tournaments incentive mechanism takes 
relative performance for comparison. As to enterprises with strong capacity, they can positively win the 
competition, and certainly won’t exert efforts in carbon emission reduction; as to enterprises with weak 
capacity, now that they will positively lose the competition, they certainly won’t participate in the 
competition. Even if they participate in the competition, they won’t exert efforts in carbon emission 
reduction. Therefore, for the central and local governments, if they want to encourage enterprises to 
participate in low-carbon development competition, the optimal strategy is to classify enterprises 
according to their capacities and organize enterprises with the same capacities into a group for 
competition. Therefore, enterprises with unequal capacities participate in competition together will not 
only decrease their own effort level, but also decrease the opponents’ effort level so that it will reduce 
overall environmental revenues of the whole society. 
(5) When ki=kj=k, namely the two enterprises have same capacities, their optimal effort level of 
carbon emission reduction will reach the peak and be equal. Namely: 
x*1 = x*2= x*=(L-l) k2/2aσπ-1/2                                                (11) 
Formula (11) reveals that, during low-carbon development, when enterprises have the same 
capacities, optimal effort level of carbon emission reduction •x is directly proportional to enterprises’ 
capability level k and bonus difference L-l, and reversely proportional to task dfficulty a and 
“performance” appraisal σ. 
3.2 Analysis on Optimal Bonus Setting by the Government 
Because the government is of risk neutral, its expected effectiveness is equal to expected 
revenue:E(U)=E(π). For convenience reason, it is written as E(π)=EZ, thus the governmental expected 
revenue is: 
EZ= k1x1+ k2x2-L-l                                                           (12) 
Substitute Formula (11) into the above formula and obtain: 
EZ= k3(L-l)/ aσπ-1/2 –L-l                                                        (13) 
Considering restriction on enterprises’ participation and incentive compatibility, thus: 
q+p1(L-l)-aσπ-1/2- a x12 /2k;  q+p2(L-l)-aσπ-1/2- a x22 /2k;  L>l>0     (14) 
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    For the two enterprises have the same capacity in low-carbon development and equal balanced 
effort level, p1=p2=k/ 2σπ-1/2. It is unnecessary for the government to pay extra bonus to enterprises, thus 
equal mark is taken between participation restriction conditions, written as L-l=Δ, that is, 
l= k3Δ2/ 8aπσ2 –kΔ/ 2σπ-1/2;  L=l+Δ                                             (15) 
Substitute Formula (15) into Formula (13) and obtain: 
MaxEz=(k3+ka- aσπ-1/2) Δ/ aσπ-1/2-k3Δ2/4aπσ2                                    (16) 
Work out First Derivative for Δ: 
∂MaxEz/∂Δ=(k3+ka- aσπ-1/2) / aσπ-1/2-k3Δ/2aπσ2                                (17) 
Assumed First Order Condition is 0, thus the optimal bonus difference set by the government is: 
Δ*=2σπ-1/2 (1+a/k2) - 2aπσ2 / k3                                            (18) 
Work out First Derivative of task difficulty a by Formula (18): 
∂Δ*/∂a=2σπ-1/2/k2 - 2aπσ2 / k3                                                 (19) 
Formula (19) reveals that, there is optimal relation for the governmental optimal bonus difference with 
task difficulty faced by enterprises and their capacities. If enterprises’ task difficulty is relatively large, 
the government needs to set correspondingly large bonus difference; if the task is simple, the government 
just needs to set relatively small bonus difference. 
Set ∂MaxEz/∂Δ<0, thus Δ*>2σπ-1/2 (1+a/k2) - 2aπσ2 / k3. Namely, when enterprises’ task difficulty is 
smaller than certain multiples of bonus difference (Δ) set by the government, ∂MaxEz/∂Δ<0, herein if 
increasing bonus difference Δ, the governmental revenue will decrease. Therefore, when enterprises face 
relatively simple tasks, the increasing of bonus difference by the government will decrease its revenue. 
The government needs to decrease bonus difference and lighten incentive strength. 
Set ∂MaxEz/∂Δ>0, thus Δ*<2σπ-1/2 (1+a/k2) - 2aπσ2 / k3. Namely, when enterprises’ task difficulty is 
larger than certain multiples of bonus difference (Δ) set by the government, ∂MaxEz/∂Δ>0, Herein, the 
increasing of bonus difference Δ will increase the governmental revenue. Therefore, when enterprises 
face relatively large task difficulty, the government needs to increase bonus difference in order to enhance 
incentive strength. 
4. Conclusion 
Based on reference to Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order tournaments mechanism model, this essay 
introduces the two variables, namely enterprises’ capacity variance and task difficulty, to establish a long-
term mechanism model for the government to encourage enterprises for low-carbon development. It is 
included through model analysis that: (1) The effort level of enterprises’ low-carbon development is 
directly proportional to bonus difference L-l set by the government;(2) When enterprises face relatively 
simple carbon emission reduction, even if the bonus difference is small or “performance” observation 
error is larger, enterprises can also exert much efforts in low-carbon development; on the contrary, when 
enterprises face relatively large task difficulty with carbon emission reduction, the government should 
increase bonus difference or improve “performance” observation accuracy in order to push forward 
enterprises to promote their optimal effort level.(3) With external conditions fixed, the larger of the two 
enterprises’ capacity variance Δk, the lower of their optimal effort level. When the two enterprises have 
the same capacities, their optimal effort level of carbon emission reduction will reach the peak and be 
equal.(4) For the government, there is certain optimal relation for optimal bonus difference with task 
difficulty facing by enterprises and their capacities. If task difficulty is relatively large, the government 
needs to establish correspondingly large bonus difference; if task difficulty is small, the government only 
needs to establish relatively small bonus difference. As to the governmental own benefits, enterprises’ 
task difficulty and capacity should be taken into consideration for setting reasonable bonus difference. 
To sum up, during the incentive process of enterprises’ low-carbon development, the government 
should take the factors such as enterprises’ task difficulty and capacity into consideration when setting 
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bonus level; when setting bonus difference, it should take enterprises’ task characteristics and capacity 
variance etc into consideration. 
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